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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
NOTES
CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON
Consent of the person injured is a defense to certain crimes against the person.
The purposte of this note is to review the Pennsylvania cases in which the defense
of consent has been considered, in an effort to determine: (1) in what crimes
is consent a defense? (2) what constitutes consent?
The most complett discussion of the law of consent in Pennsylvania is to be
found in the crime of rape. There are few cases in which consent as a defense
to other crimes against the person has been considered. Because of this fact, we
will first discuss consent as a defense to rape, then as a defense to assault and
battery and related crimes, and, finally, consent as a defense to other crimes.
RAPE
Applying the above two inquiries to the crime of rape we find: (1) consent
of the female is a defense to this crime against the person; and, (2) the female
may be said to have consented if (a) she was legally capable of consenting, (b)
she did not manifest unwillingness that the act be done, and (c) her consent was
not vitiated by fraud or duress.
Lack of consent on the part of the female is the most important element of
the crime of rape.1 The distinction between rape at common law and other acts of
illicit carnal knowledge is the element of consent.2 Nearly all the cases referred
to in this section may be cited for the proposition that consent is a defense to rape.
This is a rule of the common law which, as will be noted, has been but slightly
modified by statute. The important consideration remaining, then, is when may
the female be said to have consented? This problem will be discussed in the light
of the Pennsylvania cases under the headings above set out; i.e., capacity of the
female to give consent, manifestations of unwillingness, and the effect of fraud
or duress on consent.
Capacity To Give Consent
Consent will not be a defense to the crime of rape if the female is legally in-
capable of giving such consent.3 A female is said to be legally' incapablie
of giving her consent to acts which would otherwise constitute rape if
she is insane, unconscious, or under the "age of consent." In Commonwealth v.
Stephens,4 the defendant was indicted for raping an insane woman and he based
I Commonwealth v. Exier, 243 Pa. 155, 89 A. 968 (1914).
2 Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 555, 30 A.2d 704 (1943); Commonwealth v.
Parr, 5 W. & S. 345 (Pa. 1843).
8 Commonwealth v. Stephens, 143 Pa. Super. 394, 17 A.2d 919 (1941); Commonwealth v.
Cyaus, 88 Pa. Super. 227 (1926) ; Commonwealth ex. rel. Case v. Smith, 134 Pa. Super. 183, 3
A.2d i007 (1939).
4 143 Pa. Super. 394, 17 A.ad 919 (1941).
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his defense on the fact that the woman had given her consent. It was held, in
finding the defendant guilty, that an act of sexual intercourse is presumed to be
without the woman's consent when, from any cause, she is not in a position to ex-
ercise any judgment about the matter. "Where intercourse is had with a nonresist-
ing and consenting insane woman who has not the capacity to understand the nature
of her act, it constitutes rape." It would appear from this that if the female has
sufficient intellect to know the nature of the act, and gives hr consent, it is not
rape. There are several old lower court decisions in Pennsylvania which have dis-
cussed the incapacity of the female to consent when she is unconscious. In one
case,5 the prosecutrix had fainted and was unconscious when the attack took place.
It was held that connection with a woman, when insensible or unconscious from
whatever cause, is rape. In another case, 6 the defendant was convicted for rape com-
mitted on a woman while she was under the influence of ether. Still another Penn-
sylvania case indicated that consent would be negatived by the fact that the female
was asleep at the time of the attack." In Commonwealth v, Parr,8 broader language
was employed by the Supreme Court in stating that "consent would not be a defense
if the defendant had in any way rendered the prosecutrix incapable of consenting."O
There is another important class of cases in which the female is said to be
incapable of consenting. Thus, females below a certain age cannot give legally ef-
fective consent. At common law the age below which a female could not give ef-
fective consent was ten years. 10 As late as 1886 in Pennsylvania, the consent of
an eleven year old girl would have reduced the offense from rape to fornication."
It was not until 1887 that consensual intercourse between a male of sixteen or
more years and a female under th'e age of sixteen was made rape by statute. 12 This
statute raised the age of consent to sixteen, and there it has stayed. There are
many Pennsylvania cases which illustrate the problems which arise with respect
to the "age of consent." In Commonwealth v. Exler,18 the lower court had found
the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree under the statutory felony-murd-
er doctrine. 14 He had killed a twelve year old girl in an attempt to have sexual in-
tercourse with her. The conviction was reversed by the Supreme Court on the
grounds that the word "rape," as used in the murder statute,' 5 is limited to com-
5 Commonwealth v. Childs, 2 Pitts. Rep. 391 (1863).
6 Commonwealth v. Beale, Phila. Q. S., see Whart. & S. Med. Jur. 1245 et. seq., 596, 612.
For reasons unknown to the writer the correctness of this verdict was doubted and the Governor
later granted the defendant a pardon.
7 Commonwealth v. Duchnicz, 42 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 651L (1914).
8 5 W. & S. 345 (Pa. 1843).
9 Italics supplied.
10 Commonwealth v. Miller, 80 Pa. Super. 309 (1922); Commonwealth v. Exler, 243 Pa.
155, 89 A. 968 (1914); Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 66 Pa. D. & C. 246 (1948).
11 Commonwealth v. Stevick, 78 Pa. 460 (1875).
12 Act of May 19, 1887, P. L. 128, 18 P. S. 2261; Act of June 24, 1939, P. L 872, 1721, 18
P. S. 4721.
1 See note 1, supra.
14 Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872 701, 18 P. S. 4701.
15 Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 382 174, 18 P. S. 2221; Act of June 24, 1939), P. L 872
1701, 18 P. S. 4701.
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mon law rape and does not include statutory rape as denounced by the Act of
1887.16 Hence, the fact that the Commonwealth was unable to disprove that the
girl had consented to the intercourse led to the acquittal of the dtfentant on the
charge of murder. This case illustrates the great importance which can attach to
the defense of consent in some crimes against the person.' 7 One qualification should
be noted to the rule that consent is not a defense to "statutory rape." Thus, if the
jury finds the girl to be of "bad repute," the grade of the offense is reduced from
rape to fornication if the girl was between the ages of ten and sixteen and she con-
sented to the intercourse.' 8 If the girl is under ten years of age the question of her
consent is immaterial. 19 A child under the age of ten is said to be "so young as to
be incapable of any will or consent in sexual matters, and does not and cannot
take in the meaning of what is done.''20
So, in summary of capacity to give consent, the courts and the legislature
of Pennsylvania have established that a female is legally incapable of giving con-
sent if she is insane, unconscious, or below the age of consent.
Manifestations Of Unwillingness
Consent will not be a defense to the crime of rape if the female manifested un-
willingness that the act be done.2 1 She must clearly manifest her unwillingness
and mere submission in such cases is equivalent to consent.2 2 The question of
the woman's willingness at the time of the act is for the jury. There are three
important factors, however, the presence or absence of which weigh heavily in
favor of the respective parties. Thus, proof of failure to resist, to cry out, or
to complain promptly after the attack, tends strongly to indicate that there was
willingness that the act be done.
The amount of resistance required to negative consent depends upon the cir-
cumstances of the particular case. The, same attempt to resist need not be expected
of a small child as would be expected of an older woman.2 ' In Commonwealth v.
Montgomery,25 the defendant had simply told the ten and eleven year old girls
"to stand still" while he made the improper advances. It was held that even though
the girls made no effort to resist, the relative strength of the defendant as com-
pared to the physical and mental conditions of the girls was sufficient to enable
16 See note 12, supra.
17 See Commonwealth v. Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 67 A.2d 276 (1949), for a comparison.
18 Commonwealth v. Calvery, 130 Pa. Super. 575, 198 A. 450 (1938); Commonwealth v.
Howe, 42 Pa. Super. 136 (1910) ; Commonwealth v. San Juan, 129 Pa. Super. 179, 195 A. 433
(1937).
19 Commonwealth v. Cyaus, 88 Pa. Super. 227 (1926).
20 Commonwealth ex. rel. Case v. Smith, 134 Pa. Super. 183, 3 A.2d 1007 (1939).
21 Consent has been defined as an indication of willingness that an act be done. The
tautological effect which this definition gives the first sentence is felt not to detract from its
meaning in light of subsequent discussion.
22 Commonwealth v. Parr, 5 W. & S. 345 (Pa. 1843).
28 Commonwealth v. Berklowitz, 133 Pa. Super. 190, 2 A.2d 516 (1939).
24 Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 66 Pa. D. & C. 246 (1948).
215 Ibid.
NOTES
the jury to find that the attack had been made without the consent of the girls.
In an earlier case, 26 the defendant was held not guilty of rape when the prosecutrix
failed to testify that she made the least effort to prevent the defendant from hav-
ing intercourse with her, nor that he in any way rendered her incapable of doing
so. She testified, "I did not give my consent." The Supreme Court interpreted this
to mean "I did not give my express consent" and held that this was not a sufficient
manifestation of unwillingness to negative consent.2 7 In Commonwealth v. Cbilds,2s
the court said "when there is nothing to deter a woman from resisting, and she
is conscious and able to show dissent, and does not do so, it will be taken as her
assent." The d'egree of force manifested has an important bearing on the question
of resistance. Two Pennsylvania cases have mentioned this factor. In the earlier
case,29 it was stated that absence of consent can be proved by showing that the
woman's resistance was overcome by "fear of great personal injury." In the later
case,3 0 the prosecutrix had refused to have intercourse with the defendant so he
took hold of her, pulled her into a corner, and threatened to shoot her if she cried
out. This was a sufficient display of force to negative consent even in the absence
of any proof that the prosecutrix had resisted,
Failure on the part of the woman to cry out when she is being attacked tends
to show consent. Again, as in the cast of resistance, all the circumstances of the
case must be considered in determining whether the woman reacted reasonably.Sl
"We could expect a grown woman whose cries could by possibility be heard, to cry
out, while a young girl of tender years might be excused from doing so."82 It is
a question for the jury, not a legal rule.3 8 In Commonwealth v. Morgan,8" the de-
fendant relied on the fact that the prosecutrix had not cried out in order to estab-
lish that he had done nothing improper, 'and that what he did do was done with
the prosecutrix's consent. Defendant was a practicing physician. Prosecutrix, a pa-
tient, while she was ostensibly being given medical treatment felt that she had
been violated when, in pursuance of defendant's directions, she was in such a posi-
tion as to be unable to see what he was doing. She made no outcry but she com-
plained to the defendant immediately, and soon after reported the incident to her
husband. The Superior Court, in sustaining the conviction of rape, felt that the case
was distinguishable from others,8 5 for here the prosecutrix had no reason to fear
that such penetration was about to take place and, hence, her failure to cry out
was understandable. If there were other people nearby, and the alleged victim
26 See note 22, supra.
27 Italics supplied.
28 See note 5, supra.
29 Ibid.
30 See note 11, supra.
81 Commonwealth v. Oyler, 130 Pa. Super. 405, 197 A. 508 (1938).
32 See note 11, supra.
38 Ibid.
84 162 Pa. Super. 105, 56 A.2d 275 (1948).
8 Commonwealth v. Berklowitz, 133 Pa. Super. 190, 2 A.zd 516 (1939); Commonwealth
v. Moran, 97 Pa. Super. 120 (1930).
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of rape knew this, her failure to cry out is a strong indication that she was not un-
willing that the act be done.3 6
Failure to make prompt complaint of the alleged attack points strongly towards
establishing consent at the time of the offense, and is deemed an important test
of a woman's sincerity.8 7 In Commonwealth v. Oyler,8 8 the attack took place some
distance fr6m the prosecutrix's home. After the attack she had (1) gotten a ride
with two strangers back to town, but said nothing of the attack to them; (2) an
associate at the school where she taught drove her to a friend's house, but she said
nothing to the associate of the attack; (3) reported the attack to the police within
five days. The defendant's conviction was sustained by the Superior Court since
the prosecutrix complained within a reasonable time. In other cases, the lapse
of several months until the prosecutrix found herself pregnant, 9 and until a
child was born,40 has been deemed strong enough evidence of consent to reduce
the offense from rape to fornication.
So, in summary of manifestations of unwillingness, evidence of resistance, out-
cry, and prompt complaint, is strongly indicative of unwillingness that the act be
done. Such evidence is not material if the female is under the age of consent. 41
Effect Of Fraud Or Duress On Consent
Consent of the female is a defense to rape even though the consent was ob-
tained by certain types of fraud. 4- In Commonwealth v. Duchnicz,43 the defendant
had been a boarder in the prosecutrix's house. On the evening in question h-'had
gotten in bed with the prosecutrix posing as her husband. She, believing him to be
her husband, had intercourse with him. It was not until the act was completed that
the woman discovered that the defendant was not her husband. The court clearly
doubted the credibility of the woman's testimony. It appeared that a light had
shown in the room from the hallway, and there was contradiction in the prose-
cutrix's statements as to just when she had awakened. The court found the defend-
ant not guilty of rape and held that there can be no conviction where a man has
carnal knowledge of another man's wife, who consents to such intercourse in the
belief that he is her husband, simply because she finds him in her bed. Another
lower court said, in an earlier case,44 "no amount of deception or fraud, however
villainous or outrageous, will make illicit intercourse constitute rape where the
woman consents to the act." These cases are the only ones in Pennsylvania which
36 Ibid.
37 Commonwealth v. Jordan, 156 Pa. Super. 109, 39 A.2d 527 (1944); Commonwealth v.
Mtynarczyk, 34 Pa. Super. 256 (1908).
88 See note 31, supra.
89 See note 22, supra.
40 Commonwealth v. Moran, 97 Pa. Super. 120 (1930).
41 Commonwealth v. Feist, 50 Pa. Super. 152 (1912) ; Commonwealth v. Ebert, 146 Pa.
Super. 362, 22 A.2d 610 (1941) ; Commonwealth v. Krick, 164 Pa. Super. 516, 67 A.2d 746 (1949).
42 Commonwealth v. Duchnicz, 42 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 651 (1914).
43 Ibid.
44 See note 5, supra.
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consider the vitiating effect of fraud on consnt given to acts which would other-
wise constitute rape. No cases could be found in which our higher courts have
considered this point.
Duress may negative effective consent. Thus, if the female consents under
threats of personal injury the consent is not effective. The Pennsylvania cases
which have dealt with this question were discussed above,45 and they would in-
dicate that the threat must be of "great personal injury." 46
ASSAULT AND BATTERY AND RELATED CRIMES
There is a dearth of material in Pennsylvania on consent as a defense to the
crime of assault and battery. There is sufficient authority, however, for the proposi-
tion that there is no assault and battery if the person against whom the act was di-
rected gave his consent. 47 Lack of consent, then, is an element of the crime of as-
sault and battery. 48 There are not enough cases in which the consent element has
been considered to give a clear picture of just what constitutes consent in this crime
against the person. It appears that the same tests which apply to consent in rape
would also apply to consent in assault and battery, What discussion there is on this
point must be found in relation to other crimes in which the crime of assault and
battery is itself an element. Thus, the common law offense of indecent assault
and the statutory "assault with intent to ravish" both comprehend an assault and
battery.4" Many of the cases involving the latter two crimes were considered above
in our discussion of rape. Still, in view of the fact that these crimes partake of
some of the characteristics of' assault and battery, as well as of rape,50 it is felt that
a short, separate consideration of them would not be amiss in a discussion of con-
sent as a defense to crimes against the person.
Consent is a defense to the common law crime of indecent assault. 51 This
crime has been defined as "the taking by a man of indecent liberties with the person
of a female without her consent and against her will, but with no intent to commit
the crime of rape." 52 The age of consent in this crime is ten years.5" As in the crime
of rape, all the circumstances of the case must be considered in determining whether
45 See notes 29 and 30, supra.
46 See note 29, supra.
47 Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 137 Pa. Super. 511, 10 A.2d 90 (1939); Commonwealth v.
Gregory, 132 Pa. Super. 507, 1 A.2d 501 (1938); Commonwealth v. DeGrange, 97 Pa. Super.
181 (1929); Commonwealth v. Shrodes, 354 Pa. 70, 46 A.2d 483 (1946).
49 See Commonwealth v. Bird, 152 Pa. Super. 648, 33 A.2d 531 (1943); and Common-
wealth v. Gregory, ibid, which cite RESTATEMENT, TORTs 918, lack of consent of battery with
approval.
49 Commonwealth v. Kuhns, 7 Pa. D. & C. 670 (1925) (indecent assault) ; Commonwealth v.
Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 555, 30 A.2d 704 (1943) (assault with intent to ravish).
50 Commonwealth ex. rel. Conrad v. Warden of Eastern State Penitentiary, 165 Pa. Super.
374, 67 A.2d 645 (1949); Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 555, 30 A.2d 704 (1943).
51 Commonwealth v. Balles, 163 Pa. Super. 467, 62 A.2d 91 (1948) ; Commonwealth v. De-
Grange, 97 Pa. Super. 181 (1929); Commonwealth v. Shrodes, 354 Pa. 70, 46 A.2d 483 (1946).
62 Ibid.
63 Commonwealth v. Miller, 80 Pa. Super. 309 (1922); and note 51, supra.
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the female did, in fact, consent. 54 In "assault with intent to ravish,"55 the offense
consists of an assault and battery committed with the specific intent to accomplish
sexual intercourse forcibly and without the consent of the victim.H6 Where criminal
conduct falls short of the completed offense of rape or statutory rape, it is es-
sentially equivalent to the crime of assault and battery with intent to ravish.
67
Consensual intercourse is not within the terms of such assault and battery as is
required by the statute.A8 The age of consent in assault with intent to ravish is the
same as at common law. The consent of a five year old, again, is immaterial.69
In this crime the conduct of the actor must be such as to justify the infetnce that
he intended forcibly to have unlawful carnal knowledge of the woman if he could
not obtain her consent.
60
Our Pennsylvania cases indicate that consent obtained by fraud is no defense
to the crime of assault and battery, nor is it a defense to these two related crimes.
In Commonwealth v. Gregory,6 the defendant had obtained the consent of the
prosecutrix to inspect the condition of her artificial leg by representing that he
was a doctor of medicine when he was, in fact, a doctor of theology. Defendant
was indicted for (1) assault and battery, and (2) indecent assault. He relied on
the defense of consent. The Superior Court, in sustaining the conviction, held
that any consent the defendant had obtained was vitiated by perpetration of the
fraud. A statement to the sam effect was made in an earlier case in an indictment
for assault with intent to ravish.
62
In some situations the consent of the person touched is not material in a
prosecution for assault and battery. Thus, the touching may be privileged because
of the relationship between the parties, 3 or because the person doing the touch-
ing is acting in defense of his person or property.64
54 Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 66 Pa. D. & C. 246 (1948); Commonwealth v. Hunter,
81 Pitts. L. J. 333.
fis Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872 1722, 18 P. S. 4722.
56 Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 555, 30 A,2d 704 (1943).
51 Commonwealth ex. rel. Conrad v. Warden of Eastern State Penitentiary, 165 Pa. Super.
374, 67 A.2d 645 (1949).
68 See note 56, supra.
69 Commonwealth v. Cyaus, 88 Pa. Super. 227 (1926) ; Commonwealth v. Barber, 45 Pa. D.
& C. 620 (1942).
60 Commonwealth. v. Jaynes, 137 Pa. Super. 511, 10 A.2d 90 (1939); Commonwealth v.
Shrodes, 354 Pa. 70, 46 A.2d 483 (1946); Commonwealth v. Heaton, 145 Pa. Super. 223, 20
A.2d 921 (1941).
61 132 Pa. Super. 507, 1 A.2d 501 (1938).
62 Commonwealth v. Bell, 13 Pa. Super. 576 (1900).
63 Commonwealth v. Blaker, 1 Brewst. 311 (1869) (parent-child); Commonwealth v.
Fell, 11 Haz. Pa. Reg. 179 (teacher-child); Commonwealth v. D Angelo, 29 Pa. Super. 378
(1905) (touching by arresting officer).
64 Commonwealth v. Sutton, 51 Pa. Super. 191 (1912) (defense of person); Common.
wealth v. Warner, 13 Pa. Super. 461 (1900) (defense of property).
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CONSENT IN OTHER CRIMES
From an examination of the foregoing crimes it should be noted that if
lack of consent is an element of a crime, then consent will usually be a defense
to that crime. One other test must be applied in determining whether or not con-
sent is a defense to a particular crime. Thus, consent is not a defense in a prosecu-
tion for an act which is made criminal because it primarily injures the public. 6 S
This latter test makes the consent of the victim immaterial in a very large number
of crimes. The courts and the legislature do not make clear their reasons for class-
ifying some crimes as crimes against the public and others as crimes against the
person. Whatever the basis for the distinction, such a distinction is made,68 and
consent is not a defensQ to those crimes which are "made" criminal because they
primarily tend to injure the public. Hence, in an indictment for sodomy,6 7 forni-
cation,68 adultery, 9 or incest, 70 the defense that the victim consented cannot be
interposed. These are crimes against the public rather than crimes against the per-
son, and consent is not a defense.
Robbery is a crime against property and against the person. Although there
is little Pennsylvania authority on the point, it appears that our courts would ad-
here to the view that consent of the victim is a defense to the crime of robbery.71
In Commonwealth v. Hollister,7 2 however, a paymaster, who was about to be
robbed, was informed of the plot by the police, and he agreed not to resist the
robbery. It was held that the defendants were not any the less guilty even though
the victim had, in effect, consented to be robbed.
Consent will not excuse the taking of life. In Smith v. Commonwealth, 78 the
defendant, who was indicted for burglary, had agreed in writing that he would
not appeal his case. The Supreme Court held that this agreement would not serve
as a basis for quashing the appeal. The Court said, "What consideration can a
man have received, adequate to imprisonment at hard labor for life? It is going
but one step further to make an agreement to be hanged. I presume that no
one would be hardy enough to make an agreement to be hanged." This case has
been cited for the proposition that consent will not be a defense to homicide.
74
66 HITCHLER, THE LAW OF CRIMES 206 (1939).
66 Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 874, 878; CHAND, THE LAW OF CONSENT, p. 9 (1897).
67 Commonwealth v. Donahue, 136 Pa. Super. 306, 7 A.2d 13 (1939); Commonwealth v.
Pichierre, 36 Luz. L. Reg. 409 (1942).
68 Commonwealth v. Moon, 151 Pa. Super. 555, 30 A.2d 704, (1943).
69 Ibid. Helfrich v. Commonwealth, 33 Pa. 68 (1859).
70 Commonwealth v. Ebert, 146 Pa. Super. 362, 22 A.2d 610 (1941).
71 Commonwealth v. Snelling, 4 Binney 379 (Pa. 1812) ; Commonwealth v. Hollister, 157 Pa.
13, 27 A. 386, 25 L. R. A. 349 (1893).
72 157 Pa. 13, 27 A. 386 (1893).
78 14 S. & R. 69 (Pa. 1826).
74 CHAND, THE LAW OF CONSENT, p. 393.
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CONCLUSION
Consent is a defense to crimes against the person if (1) lack of consent is
an element of the crime, (2) the crime is not one injurious to the public generally:
provided, that (a) the person injured was legally capable of consenting, (b) the
person did not manifest unwillingness that the act be done, and (c) the consent
given was not vitiated by fraud or duress.
JAMEs J. LORIMER
